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Abstract  
 Urban community gardens (UCGs) are receiving greater attention as an ever-
growing body of research documents the economic, environmental and social benefits 
that community gardens are bringing to urban neighborhoods. However, land 
insecurity remains one of the critical barriers to the future success of UCGs; loss of land 
to both private and public entities has frustrated many efforts and has stimulated 
investigations into alternative strategies for increasing land security. This thesis explores 
the diversity of land tenure solutions – with a particular respect to land trusts - that have 
been implemented to address this issue. Land security is objectively defined by legal 
property rights and subjectively shaped through the notion of ‘ownership in use’ and by 
encouraging the formation of mobilized communities. We analyze the variety of 
organizational modes – differentiated by tenurial arrangement, organizational capacity, 
political leverage and organizational mission/internal governance relations – and the 
resulting impacts on the type and level of land security. Data was collected through 
transcribed interviews with practitioners from sixteen land trust organizations engaged 
in urban community gardening and summarized along emergent themes regarding 
organizational modes and resulting land security implications. We find that major 
tradeoffs exist between maximizing land tenure security and operating a larger number 
of UCG sites under less secure tenure arrangements. It concludes that underutilized 
opportunities exist to increase UCG land security through an increased public sector role 
and broader cross-sectoral partnerships.  
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“Once we begin to speak of people mixing their labor with the earth,  
we are in a whole world of new relations between people and nature…”  
 - Raymond Williams  
 
“Land security has always been and always will be the most pressing issue”  
 - Interview, Growing Power 
  
1.  Introduction 
 Despite the generally lukewarm stance of the traditional planning apparatus, 
urban agricultural production has always taken place in cities, sometimes hidden and 
sometimes explicit (Redwood, 2009). But in a rapidly urbanizing world (and in a 
predominantly urban nation), it is a critical challenge for the planning profession to 
develop sustainable food systems to support these urban agglomerations. We are now in 
an era where urban food production is increasingly seen as a legitimate planning and 
policy issue that intersects with a host of more conventional arenas such as public health, 
open-space systems, community development and environmental planning. In 
particular, urban community gardens are receiving greater attention as an ever-growing 
body of research documents the economic, environmental and social benefits that 
community gardens are bringing to urban neighborhoods. However, land insecurity 
remains one of the critical barriers to the future success of urban community gardens; 
loss of land to both private and public entities has frustrated many efforts and 
stimulated investigations into alternative strategies for securing community garden 
lands. The community garden literature has frequented cited the potential of land trust 
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organizations in addressing land tenure insecurity (ACGA, 1998a; Brown et al., 2002; 
Kaufman and Bailkey, 2000). Given this emphasis, we seek to understand how such land 
trust/community garden arrangements are manifesting on the ground. 
This study describes the diversity of mechanisms that land trust organizations 
have utilized to access urban land for community gardens and the relative success of 
these strategies in improving land security. An argument is made that urban community 
gardens should be seen as essential public infrastructure and deserving of substantial 
public support. To date there have been a handful of individual case studies on specific 
land trusts arrangements involving urban community gardens. This study fills a gap in 
the existing literature by taking a broader look at the multitude of institutional 
arrangements in this context. Data was collected through transcribed interviews with 
practitioners from sixteen land trust organizations engaged in urban community 
gardening and summarized along emergent themes regarding organizational modes 
and resulting land security implications.  
 
1.1 Defining Urban Community Gardens 
The urban community garden (UCG) is a familiar concept at face value but has 
multiple layers of meaning and cultural attachments that require more precise 
explanation (Kurtz, 2001). Urban agriculture is a broad umbrella term - defined as all 
productive cultivation in and around cities1 - with the UCG being one particular form 
(Von Hassel, 2002). The American Community Gardening Association (ACGA) defines 
community gardens expansively as “any piece of land gardened by a group of people” 
(2012a). However, since the 1970s, UGCs have become strongly associated with one 
particular manifestation – the neighborhood garden with subdivided plots for 
individual household use (Brown et al., 2002).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 For a more robust definition of urban agriculture see Mougeot, 2000. 	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Further clarity is needed to define the meaning of urban, community and garden. 
‘Urban’ refers to the spatial context of productive cultivation that happens in urban, 
suburban and periurban areas, frequently occurring on vacant or abandoned city-owned 
parcels. ‘Urban’ does not refer exclusively to the context of large cities but widely 
applies to all community garden sites in relatively dense locations. There is no bright 
line that distinguishes urban from rural, but we exclude from our scope farmland and 
large-scale agricultural programs that are typical of rural settings. Rural farmland 
preservation is a considerably different endeavor that deals with a unique set of visions, 
goals and challenges and a larger scale of intervention  (Springer, 2006).  
‘Community’ represents the interface where private and public lives meet (Von 
Hassell, 2002). Community gardens are distinguished from broader urban agriculture by 
the degree of social orientation and opportunities for community engagement and 
activism. ‘Community’ means the scale of engagement extends significantly beyond the 
sphere of the immediate household or firm. We are not concerned with urban 
agricultural production that is purely private in nature (private backyard gardens and 
orchards, terrace gardens, private commercial farms, etc.) as such operations are less 
likely to substantially affect the public health, food security and social capital of 
individuals beyond the immediate sphere of production2. Small-scale commercial 
agricultural production – for sale to third parties rather than household consumption - 
can be found in many community gardens but is typically a secondary aim if present at 
all. Such commercial operations are often prohibited by official UCG rules, though many 
are tolerated on a “don’t ask, don’t tell” basis (Interview, MACLT). Kurtz (2001) finds 
that ‘community’ simultaneously holds multiple and differentiated meanings that refer 
to a variety of physical and psychological relations. In short, the ‘community’ aspect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  We do not discount the importance of privately-oriented urban agricultural production, but recognize key 
differences in social orientation that their warrant exclusion from this study.	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community gardens extends beyond mere food production and engages with a nested 
multitude of larger social realms (Von Hassell, 2002).  
 Finally, the idea of the ‘garden’ grounds the concept of the UCG back in nature, 
suggesting that certain characteristics of agricultural production make community 
gardens unique from other forms of public spaces. UCGs always have a strong food 
production component but some have been programmed to include other uses such as 
flower gardens, playgrounds and sitting areas. What makes the garden unique is access 
to physical land as ‘nature’. This is frequently invoked as serving as a ‘foil to the city’ 
and ameliorative of crowded urban conditions (Lawson, 2005). Further, gardens can be 
representative of a spiritual connectedness to land (Brueggeman, 2002), the cultural and 
historical meanings embodied in seeds (Shiva, 2000) and even the mythical American 
heritage of the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer (Bassett, 1981). Community gardens can also 
serve as a strategic neighborhood development tool as gardens offer quick and highly 
visible impacts with relatively inexpensive inputs (Lawson, 2005). To sum, UCGs are a 
unique type of urban open space that deserves greater acknowledgement in the 
planning realm, as some cities are finally doing by recognizing UCGs in planning 
documents (Policylink, 2011).  
1.2 Benefits of Urban Community Gardens 
In the United States, there is a long and episodic history of UCGs in the planning 
discourse dating back to the 1890s with at least seven distinct gardening ‘movements’ 
including: Potato Patches (1894-1917), School Gardens (1900-1920), Garden City Plots 
(1905-1920, Liberty Gardens (1917-1920), Relief Gardens (1930-1939), Victory Gardens 
(1941-1945) and Community Gardens (1970-Present) (Bassett, 1979). The reoccurring 
popularity of the UCG is a testament to its flexibility, each time responding to particular 
economic and social crisis, and tailoring itself to the ideology of the times. The 
justifications for such programs are surprisingly consistent – access to nature, education, 
and self-help in the production of food for personal use – though particularities are 
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unique to different eras and social contexts (Lawson, 2005). In recent decades, the rise of 
the community development, environmental and food security movements has again 
increased the prominence and popularity of UCGs (Von Hassell, 2002; Hodgson, 
Campbell & Bailkey, 2011). The American Community Gardening Association estimates 
that there are currently over 18,000 (urban and rural) community gardens in the United 
States and Canada (ACGA, 2012b). 
Studies have documented the many environmental, economic and social benefits 
that UCGs afford to communities. Commonly cited environmental benefits includes 
brownfield remediation, ecological restoration, creation of open space, improving air 
quality, and decreasing food miles with resulting reduction of transportation 
externalities (Irvine, Johnson & Peters, 1999; Mendes et al., 2008; Mougeot, 2006; Rosol, 
2006; Smit, Ratta, & Nasr, 1996).  
Others have also linked UCGs with economic returns such as increases in local 
property values. In one study, community gardens increased property values by an 
average of 9.4 percentage points and increased government tax revenues by a half 
million dollars per garden over 20 years (Voicu & Been, 2001). On the flip side, such 
capitalization of local amenities into property values also reduces housing affordability 
and can accelerate gentrification processes (Linn, 1999). Local governments can also 
benefit from reduced expenditures as UCG operations tend to have much lower 
maintenance costs than parks and formal open spaces, especially when private groups 
(such as land trusts and local block groups) assume responsibility for garden 
maintenance and capital improvements (Pothukuchi and Bickes, 2001). However, the 
justice behind such devolution of state responsibility is an ongoing source of tension.  
Scholars also cite the numerous social benefits of UCGs including improved 
nutrition, heightened food security, better mental health, increased physical activity and 
cultural expression, and opportunities for education and job skills training (Brown and 
Jameton, 2000; Bellows, Brown, Smit, 2004; Lawson, 2004; Wakefield et al., 2007). Others 
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have noted the importance of UCGs in nurturing community organizing efforts (Von 
Hassell, 2002; Lawson, 2005; Rosenberg, 2010) and as sites of democracy for a 
‘Habermasian’ public sphere (Stahaeli et al., 2002; Pudup, 2008; Kurtz, 2001). 
Given these wide-ranging benefits, the UCG has enjoyed a renaissance as a social 
movement and is making strong headway into public policy discourse (Von Hassell, 
2002; Hodgson et al., 2011; Policylink, 2011). Numerous municipalities like Chicago, 
New York, Seattle, San Francisco, Detroit and Cleveland have enacted innovative UCG 
policies tailored to address local issues (Policylink, 2011).  
While the literature is generally optimistic about the potential of the UCG, it is 
not without its problems. Macias (2008) cautions that some forms of UCG programs can 
allocate benefits unevenly across class structures. There are also problems with top-
down UCG organizations that lack accountability and engagement with garden-level 
users and surrounding neighborhood residents (Eizenberg, 2012).  Finally, there are 
ongoing concerns over environmental safety (especially contaminated soils) and 
conflicts over competing land use such as affordable housing (Schmelzkopf, 1995; 2002; 
Stahaeli et al., 2002; Von Hassell, 2002). 
 
1.3 Challenges Facing Urban Community Gardens 
 Despite the benefits, UCGs face many challenges, including a lack of participant 
interest and agricultural knowledge, high start-up costs, prohibitive public policies and 
insecure land tenure (Brown et al., 2002).  In particular, land security is almost always 
cited as the greatest barrier to UCG implementation and longevity (Von Hassel, 2002; 
Kaufman and Bailkey, 2000; Lawson, 2004; Wakefield et al., 2007) and even the “crux of 
the future success of urban community gardens” (ACGA, 1998:5). According to the most 
recent national survey, 99.9% of 6,020 community gardens viewed site permanency as an 
issue (ACGA, 1998).  
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 This study defines ‘land security’ in two ways. In common parlance, it refers to 
the objective right to occupy and use physical property. This type of security is objective 
in that it is embedded in the legal structure and relation to land itself and not premised 
on the subjective awareness of garden users (Davis, 1991). Put another way, this security 
is based on legal entitlements to the use of land through formal property rights (Stahaeli 
et al., 2002). But land security needs to extend beyond the objective realm to include the 
subjective meaning of UCG spaces and its potential for engendering community 
formation and mobilization around collective interests.  
 A mobilized (and subjectively conscious) garden constituency has a greater 
ability to ensure secure land tenure over a longer period of time through collective 
action. One interviewee observes, “the best protection for a community garden is for 
people to actually garden there… if it is actively used, and being maintained, it’s hard to 
change the use” (Interview, MACLT). This aspect of land security does not stem from 
legal ownership derived from the liberal-democratic tradition of private property rights 
but from a broader claim to communal ‘ownership in use’ based on moral grounds 
(Stahaeli et al., 2002). ‘Ownership in use’ refers to ‘feelings of possession in the absence 
of any formal or legal claim of ownership’ (Mayhew et al., 2007:477). This is not an 
individual but a collective rights claim made by marginalized groups in asserting 
autonomy and control over the production of public spaces in a way that suits their 
distinctive needs3 (Stahaeli et al., 2002). The long history of community garden ‘squatters’ 
movements, such as the Green Guerillas in New York City, is indicative of this 
subjectively based claim. However, a distinction needs to be made between land tenure 
security for a land trust organization and land tenure security for individual garden-
level users. The individual gardener’s right to farm a plot year after year is not 
necessarily ensured by the tenurial arrangements described in this study, but also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   This concept of spatial appropriation and reproduction along accommodative lines has a clear connection 
with the deep literature surrounding The Right to The City movement. See Lefebvre 1996; Attoh, 2011; 
Purcell, 2002; Marcuse, 2009.	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depends on the internal governance relations between a land trust organization and 
garden-level users, and the specific contractual stipulations contained in the garden-plot 
lease. To summarize, land security is not synonymous with holding title; short of 
owning the land, there are multiple formal and informal mechanisms that can achieve 
different relative levels of security for those who want to use land for community 
gardening. 
Lawson (2004) describes the historical trajectory of the UCG in the United States 
and finds that even in its early stages, community gardens were considered temporary 
uses of vacant and marginalized land that were never intended to be permanent 
operations. This stems from an inaccurate conceptualization of the UCG as a temporary, 
stopgap measure, which is inconsistent with the intent of most garden participants 
(Lawson, 2004). This condition is symptomatic of the ‘ambivalent’ relationship between 
the planning profession and the UCG field (Lawson, 2004).  Attempts to increase land 
security through private ownership have been frustrated by limited operational budgets 
and resulting lack of organizational capacity (Lawson, 2005). Many UCG organizations 
receive little or no public support and rely largely on volunteer-based staffing. Only 
5.3% of community gardens are held in some form of private ownership; the other 94.7% 
of community gardens are either (1) publically owned and operated, (2) operated on 
public or private lands through use-agreements, or (3) operated on public or private 
land without a use agreement (i.e. squatting) (ACGA, 1998).  
One problem is the UCG’s simultaneous role as a public resource and private 
investment, which complicates the concept of ‘public goods’ and the resulting course of 
planning actions (Schmelzkopf, 1995). Further, planners often view the UCG as a 
novelty rather than a legitimate land use and worthwhile social activity (Bailkey, 2004). 
Such planning orthodoxies limit the potential for more nuanced understandings of the 
urban open spaces, and planners need to recognize a greater typology of community 
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spaces beyond mere ‘parks’4 (Bailkey, 2004). More broadly, many have called into the 
question the general lack of planning interventions on food policy issues (Hodgson et al., 
2011; Pothukuchi and Kaufman, 2000; Mendes, 2006; Mougeot, 2006). 
 
1.4 Roots of Land Insecurity 
Fundamentally, the challenge of UCG land security is an expression of the 
inherent tension between different property interests. Property is largely allocated 
through the ‘hidden hand’ of the market that maximizes exchange-values to ensure the 
‘highest and best’ use of a given parcel. Tension occurs when use-values are 
incommensurate with market exchange valuations; thus property markets have inherent 
tensions at their core (Kaufman and Bailkey, 2000; Schmelzkopf, 2002; Harvey, 1973). 
There is a fundamental contradiction between those whose interests in property are 
primarily driven by exchange-value and those whose interests lie in use-values, creating 
an objective basis from which land use conflict can potentially arise5 (Davis, 1991).  
While UCGs hold values in both use and exchange for multiple and 
differentiated actors, they should be understood primarily as spaces of use-values that 
serve the accommodative needs of users (Schmelzkopf, 2002). These use-values often 
conflict with the exchange valuations of the market logic. Even the limited roles that 
UCGs serve in bolstering exchange-values are tenuous and lead to insecure futures. For 
example, Bassett (1979) contends that the ‘primary function’ of UCGs in American 
history has been as a buffering mechanism and helps support the cultural system during 
times of social and economic crisis. Thus, UCGs have gained popularity during periods 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  There are notable exceptions of cities that have taken innovative approaches to community gardens such 
as Detroit, Seattle and San Francisco.	  5	  These conflictual interests can become the basis for collective action, but it is far from guaranteed. Davis 
(1991) notes the numerous social, political, and technical conditions that permit individuals with land-based 
interests to coalesce into politically active groups. Smith and Kurtz (2003) also emphasize the role of scale 
in facilitating collective mobilization.	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of stress, only to wane in the years that follow, when such ‘adjustive institutions’ are no 
longer needed to legitimize the politico-economic institutional system (Bassett, 1979).   
Similarly, others have suggested that municipal interest in UCGs is primarily 
financial, such as bolstering neighborhood property values (Fox et al., 1995; Landman, 
1993). In this case, too, UCGs are only valuable so long as they maximize territorial 
property values. If other land uses can propel land values higher, then a UCG no longer 
serves an exchange-value function and will be replaced. Supporting this claim, Fox et al. 
(1995) note that many municipalities believe that land is simply too valuable to be held 
in long-term UCG production, a fact corroborated by an ACGA survey (1998) that found 
20% of terminated UCGs were closed due to loss of land to public agencies. Thus, in 
addressing the challenge of land security (and the inherent tensions in the property 
market), exchange valuations alone are clearly insufficient. The UCG literature has 
focused on the need for alternative tenure strategies for securing UCG land based on 
accommodative use values (ACGA, 1998a; Brown et al., 2002; Kaufman and Bailkey, 
2000).  
 
1.5 Land Trusts 
Land Trusts are one such alternative form of tenure being implemented to 
improve UCG land security. A land trust is a legally recognized, non-profit organization 
that actively works to conserve land opportunities by holding some form of property 
right and by providing stewardship activities (Land Trust Alliance, 2011). Property 
rights can be secured through a number of arrangements such as holding fee-simple title, 
conservation easements and executing use agreements. The ‘stewardship activities’ are 
wide-ranging and include monitoring, management and enforcement of land 
regulations (Land Trust Alliance, 2011). The concept of a land ‘trust’ also has a deeper 
moral meaning. Land - being simply the inherited surface of the earth - is a ‘fictitious 
commodity’ (Polanyi, 2001) and a ‘natural monopoly’ (George, 1975) that cannot be 
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treated as other private property, but needs to be held in ‘trusteeship’ for future 
generations (Swann, 2010).  
Land trusts have come under recent scrutiny as scholars debate the proper role of 
the ‘third sector’ (i.e. private, non-profits and voluntary institutions) vis-à-vis the state. 
The outsourcing of public responsibility to third sector organizations has been criticized 
as emblematic of ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Pudup, 2008; Rosol, 
2010). According to one study, a public park is 20 times more costly to develop, and 27 
times more costly to maintain, while receiving only ¼ of the use of a community garden 
(Francis, 1987). However, this dramatic cost differential largely stems from 
uncompensated and unaccounted voluntary community labor, sometimes up to 80% of 
the total garden expense (Schmelzkopf, 1995). Others note that the private production of 
garden spaces may conflict with the very concept of public spaces as sites of 
appropriation and spatial reproduction (Stahaeli et al., 2002; Katz, 1998; Eizenberg, 2012; 
Pudup, 2008). Scholars have used the term ‘privately public’ (Mulder, 2003) and 
‘governance-beyond-the-state’ (Rosol, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2005) to describe this 
ambiguous territory. Others have criticized community gardens as both a product, and a 
producer, of neoliberal ideology evidenced in its rhetoric of personal responsibility, 
efficiency, choice, consumerism, and competition (Lawson, 2005).  
There are always tradeoffs between the role of land trusts and the state. Land 
trusts can be advantageous in their focus, flexibility, and ability to deliver long-term 
conservation and affordability (Campbell and Salus, 2003). However, Jacobs (2000) 
argues that land trusts should serve as a supplement to standard land-use regulations 
within a clear public sector planning framework that incorporates public input6.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  While land trusts differ in their organizational structures, many do offer significant avenues for public 
input. For example, the ‘classic’ Community Land Trust model includes a tripartite governance structure 
with a board of directors comprised of one-third resident and leaseholder representatives, one-third 
surrounding community representatives, and one-third public officials and non-profit representatives (Davis, 
2010a).	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There are generally two types of land trusts. Conservation land trusts are often 
involved in preserving large swaths of rural land with more of a focus on the land itself, 
while community land trusts (CLTs) typically deal with urban issues and communities 
(Springer, 2006)7. The distinction between the two can become blurred as organizations 
take on multiple missions and various partnerships are formed. This study is interested 
in the potential of land trusts in relation to UCGs, so both types – conservation and 
community – will be examined. We will briefly look beyond legally defined land trusts 
to investigate similar non-profit organizations with tenurial arrangements that are 
functionally similar to those of UCG land trusts.    
The bright line that functionally (though not legally) defines a land trust from 
other non-profits is often blurred when it comes to UCGs. The land trust literature is 
generally divided into two sub-literatures; the conservation land trust literature focuses 
on rural agricultural conservation through title acquisition and conservation easements 
(Merenlender et al., 2004), while the community land trust literature tends to focus on 
issues of urban affordable housing (Davis, 2006; Greenstein & Sungu-Eryilmaz, 2005; 
Curtin & Bocarsly, 2010; Thaden, 2011). However, despite the current emphasis on 
housing production, the community land trust model actually originated with 
agricultural issues in 1960s rural Georgia, with earlier agricultural influences such as the 
kibbutzim in Israel, the Gramdan villages in India, and the Garden Cities of Ebenezer 
Howard (Davis, 2010a; Shepard, 2010). 
Within the land trust literature a twin movement has been occurring. 
Conservation land trusts are expanding their emphasis to tackle more urban issues 
(Campbell and Salus, 2003), while community land trusts are recognizing the need to 
move ‘beyond housing’ in community development efforts (Rosenberg, 2010). In this 
vein, recent studies document specific examples of land trusts and UCG partnerships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For a more detailed examination of the conservation and community land trust structures and the 
differences between them see: Institute for Community Economics, 2010 [1982]; Davis, 2010b.	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(Rosenberg, 2010; Hersch, 2010, Campbell and Salus, 2003). However, Sheehan (2005) 
notes that UCG programs are complex arrangements that do not have standardized 
solutions. While individual case studies shed important light on specific practices, there 
is a need for broader research that examines the diversity of land trust arrangements. It 
is not enough to recommend the use of the land trust tool to secure UCG land; we need a 
more nuanced understanding of the different ways land trusts organizations are 
implementing UCG tenure arrangements and the relative success of these organizational 
forms in improving land security.  
This study does not suggest that (1) UCGs are always an appropriate or 
necessarily desirable land use, (2) land insecurity is the only major challenge facing 
UCGs, or (3) land trusts are the best tool for addressing land insecurity. Other 
interventions such as government purchase, private and public partnerships, and 
flexible, short-term programs may be viable alternatives and should continue to be 
explored (Brown et al., 2002). The existing literature has explained the history of UCG 
programs, benefits and challenges facing UCG implementation, possible venues for 
policy intervention, and specific case studies of such interventions. This study fills a gap 
in the literature by taking a broader look at the multitude of institutional arrangements 
and their impacts on land security. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
While land trusts and UCGs are respectively quite prevalent, there are relatively 
few organizations that have attempted to combine both. An initial list of potential 
organizations was identified by contacting individuals knowledgeable in both land 
trusts and UCGs. These included contacts at the National Community Land Trust 
Network, the Land Trust Alliance and the American Community Gardening Association. 
A purposive sample was selected to represent the largest variety of UCG arrangements. 
For the sake of concision, when similar organizations were identified, only one was 
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included in the study. Through the course of research, it became clear that the bright line 
differentiating UCG land trusts from other non-profit community garden organizations 
was actually quite blurry and the sample was then expanded to include a larger variety 
of institutional arrangements. For example, both legally defined land trusts and mission-
driven, non-profits utilized fee-simple ownership and informal use agreements to secure 
community gardens. For the remainder of this study, the term ‘UCG organization’ will 
be broadly applied to mean mission-driven, non-profit, private-sector organizations 
involved in the creation and long-term maintenance of UCGs. This includes legally 
recognized land trusts (even those that do not hold title to land) and non-profits that are 
not legally recognized land trusts, but operate in a similar fashion (holding title to land,  
executing use agreements and providing stewardship).  The identification of such 
organizations was supported by online and print research of publically available 
documents to determine the nature of each institutional arrangement. Some institutional 
arrangements will undoubtedly be missed. This represents only an early effort toward 
the analysis of UCG land trust tenure arrangements.  
This typology of UCG organizations is based on factors including: organizational 
mission, scale of engagement, tenurial arrangement, organizational capacity, political 
leverage, and internal governance relations with gardeners. In addition to online and 
print research, structured interviews were the primary source for data collection.  
 
1.7 Research Limitations 
This study examines the diversity of strategies employed by land trust 
organizations to secure land for UCGs and the relative success of these strategies in 
improving land security. Regarding limitations to this study, three are readily apparent. 
First, there is the risk of an incomplete sample arising for several reasons: relevant 
organizations could be unknown to the researcher and collaborating organizations, 
significantly unique organizations could be assumed to be similar, or relevant 
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organizations may have declined participation in the research. Further, this study only 
investigates mission-driven, non-profit, private-sector organizations and does not 
include one major holder of community gardens – local governments8 (Lawson, 2005). 
While every variation of UCG land trust arrangement was not documented, the research 
sample was sufficiently large to capture general trends and movements in the field.  
A second shortcoming arises from the interview protocol. The research 
methodology was restricted to interviews with practitioners from UCG organizations. 
Due to time and resource constraints, actual gardeners and community members could 
not be interviewed. The reality on the ground could be very different from the 
information being filtered through the parent organization. This is significant, as an 
important factor in land security is the notion of ‘ownership in use’ and the level of 
community formation and mobilization around land security threats. This methodology 
limits making conclusive statements regarding community activism and the meaning of 
UCG spaces.  
Finally, many of the organizations in this study hold title to multiple properties, 
often including dozens of gardens. Given the large number of sites, detailed information 
about specific partnerships, funding sources, and tenurial patterns for individual 
gardens was impractical to acquire. For example, Capital District Community Gardens 
operates 48 UCGs spread across three municipalities (CDCG, Interview, 2012). Only 
broad generalizations about organizational differences can be offered here. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Purely Municipally owned and operated programs, such as New York City’s Operation GreenThumb, 
were not included in this classification as land trusts do not play a significant role in such partnerships. 
Seattle’s P-Patch program was largely excluded as well, though the P-Patch Land Trust, an affiliated 
support and advocacy private-sector organization was included. Public ownership does not guarantee UCG 
land security as local governments often view community gardens as temporary land uses and are 
incentivized to maximize property tax revenues (Lawson, 2005). However, there are a number of successful 
municipal programs. We do not discount these significant efforts and innovative municipal programs 
should continue to be explored.  
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2. Land Security Implications  
 The biological concept of heterosis – or hybrid vigor – suggests that the 
combination of organisms from diverse genetic backgrounds results in stronger, more 
resilient hybrid offspring. The term was popularized in application to the community 
land trusts movement by John Emmeus Davis, who suggests that different individuals 
and organizations with unique histories and perspectives can be hybridized to produce 
stronger, more resilient models of land tenure (Davis, 2010a). Land trusts have been 
implemented in the UCG context specifically to address land tenure security. However, 
the diversity of hybrid models suggests relatively different types (objective and 
subjective) and levels of land security. A number of variables can be used to analyze and 
categorize these organizational modes including (1) tenurial arrangement, (2) capacity, 
(3) political leverage, and (4) internal governance relations with local gardeners. These 
dimensions are fluid concepts that interrelate in complex manners. For example, 
increases in political leverage vis-à-vis state agencies can result in more secure tenurial 
arrangements. The ordering of organizations' modes into distinct taxonomic ‘boxes’ is a 
considerable simplification of reality. This classification is not a formal model but a 
schematic exercise to explore variations that emerge between UCG organizational forms 
and the relative level of success in securing land.  
  
2.1 Tenurial Arrangement 9  
 Tenurial arrangement refers to the dual question of who owns land and how.  
Three broad patterns of UCG organizational tenures are identified: fee-simple 
ownership, easements and use agreements. These arrangements are not mutually 
exclusive as UCG organizations frequently operate simultaneously with multiple forms. 
Each arrangement has relative strengths and weaknesses concerning land security for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Tenurial arrangements classifications are informed by “Ownership Options: Government, Land Trust, or 
Other” by Betsy Johnson of South End Lower Roxbury Open Space Land Trust.	  
	   17	  
UCG organizations. It is also important to make the distinction between land security 
for the UCG organizations and that of individual gardeners. Even when land is secured 
for a UCG organization, the level of security for individual gardeners is dependent on 
an organization's structure and governance relations with gardeners. For example, the 
internal system of waiting lists and garden-plot leases impacts the ability of a gardener 
to farm the same garden-plot year after year. However, it may not necessarily be 
desirable to ensure complete land tenure security for individual gardeners in perpetuity. 
Many organizations consider individual hardship and household need (rather than 
simply length of tenure) when allocating garden-plots.  
 
A. Fee simple Ownership 
 UCGs organized in this pattern hold fee-simple title to community gardens. Fee-
simple -also known as freehold or fee-simple absolute – is the most common form of 
property ownership and generally has the greatest number of ‘sticks’ in the bundle of 
ownership rights10 (White, 2010). In urban areas, community gardens are often located 
on vacant or abandoned sites, where ownership responsibilities may be contested and 
long-term security uncertain. In such circumstances, fee-simple ownership is often 
considered the easiest way of insulating land from the speculative (exchange-value 
driven) exigencies of real estate markets and securing property for accommodative uses. 
However, fee-simple ownership alone does not guarantee long-term land security. As 
one respondent remarks, “even if you can own the land, there are other factors that 
make you vulnerable” (Interview, South End). Other conditions that affect land security 
include: organizational mission, funding and capacity limitations, political leverage, and 
internal governance relations. Within fee-simple ownership, there are considerable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Fee-simple is not absolute ownership, but can be encumbered in a variety of ways including: the public’s 
right to tax, regulate and take possession of property for a public purpose, utility and conservation 
easements, the duty to maintain property in reasonable conditions and the duty to operate such property in a 
manner that does not constituted a private nuisance (White, 2010). Deed-restrictions – such as those in 
homeowner association communities - can further encumber fee-simple property rights.	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similarities between legally recognized land trusts and community-based, mission-
driven, non-profit organizations that hold fee-simple title to land.  
 The organizational mission of the title-holding organization greatly impacts 
long-term security. After all, fee-simple ownership is merely one form of land tenure; its 
potential for increasing UCG land security is entirely dependent on the question of who 
owns the land and how parcels may be secured for the garden-level individuals who 
actually farm the land. Many UCG organizations in our sample have an organizational 
mission specifically dedicated to the creation and preservation of open spaces. Serving 
this single purpose helps these organizations to focus on doing one thing – holding title 
to land in perpetuity (Interview, Sawmill). Implicit in this formulation is the claim that 
community-established and community-maintained gardens are the ‘best use’11 of a 
given parcel and should remain a permanent part of the urban infrastructure (Interview, 
NeighborSpace). These organizations view community gardens as being “different from, 
but alongside” the traditional city-operated, open-space system (Interview, 
NeighborSpace).  
 There are also many examples of non-profit organizations that hold fee-simple 
title to UCGs including churches, community-based housing developers, and private 
schools, yet security of tenure is far from ensured in all these cases (Interview, MACLT). 
Some non-profit UCG owners hold title to the gardens for many years and then abruptly 
decide to develop (Interview, NeighborSpace). For example, churches often will 
purchase extra land and bank it for later potential expansions while promoting 
community gardening as a short-term use (Interview, MACLT). In these cases, fee-
simple ownership, even by a community-oriented, non-profit organization does not 
necessarily guarantee that land will continue to be used for community gardening; nor 
does it guarantee that individual gardens will have long-term security of tenure to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  ‘Best use’ refers to balance between use and exchange values, which is district from the traditional 
formulation of ‘highest and best use’ based on purely market exchange.	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continue gardening the same plots of land year after year. These gardens may be 
insulated from accumulative market pressures but are subject to differing 
accommodative claims that stems from differing organizational missions.  
 Again, this study does not assume that the UCG is necessarily the ‘best use’ for 
any given parcel. However, the issue is that the ‘best use’ for a given parcel, however 
determined, may or may not be in alignment with the internal, mission-driven interests 
of the title-holding organization. Housing developers strive to develop housing, 
churches want to expand their facilities, and open-space land trusts will want to expand 
open-space systems, sometimes excluding food production from occurring on these 
lands.12 Most land trusts have necessarily narrow interests due to the nature of 
philanthropic grants and the limits of professional experience and liability insurance 
(Interview, LA NLT). The relative merits of privately-owned, public-spaces cannot be 
fully debated here; we merely note that the central mission of a title-holding 
organization has a very real impact on the long-term prospects of UCG spaces.  
 Even the different missions and goals of various land trusts - sustainable food 
systems, neighborhood development or agricultural research – can impact long-range 
outcomes. One respondent shared an experience between the title-holding land trust 
and the non-profit community organization that was in charge of managing the 
community garden. The executive director of the managing organization thought the 
gardens were not ‘pulling their weight’ financially and stimulated controversy by 
proposing the removal of organizational staffing, making the gardens purely volunteer 
supported13 (Interview, MACLT). Thus, even when land is secured by a UCG 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Many interviewees note that accommodative land use changes, though rare, are theoretically possible. If 
a community were to approach a land trust with a legitimate alternate use (from a garden to a playground) 
many would be willing to transfer title to a more suitable entity – such as the local parks department 
(Interview, Neighborspace).	  	  	  13	  There was significant pushback to this proposal and the staff support was not removed. But the 
controversy contributed to the executive director leaving the organization.	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organization, tensions can still arise from different organizational missions, interests, 
and management personalities.  
 Alternately, organizations with wider missions also have the potential to increase 
UCG land security through access to a greater variety of funding sources and cross-
sectoral collaborations. For example, many community land trusts have a mission 
dedicated to broad neighborhood development with a strong affordable housing 
component. Access to housing-related funds can help cross-subsidize the acquisition of 
land for UCG purposes. The experience of Troy Gardens in Madison, Wisconsin 
highlights such possibilities14. At Troy Gardens, several long-standing community 
gardens were threatened when the county government placed the 31-acre parcel up for 
auction. Local groups organized to defend their community gardens and created an 
alternative plan that left 26 of the 31-acres (including the gardens) undeveloped while a 
cluster of affordable housing was sited on the remaining 5-acres. The Madison Area 
Community Land Trust (MACLT) purchased the entire 31-acre site using a variety of 
funding sources; 26-acres were purchased from the county using Community 
Development Block Grant funds for green space preservation and agriculture and the 
remaining 5 acres were purchased using funds from the Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Economic Development Initiative. By maintaining a wider 
development focus, MACLT was able to garner broad governmental support and 
leverage both housing and open space funds to make title acquisition of the entire 31-
acre plot possible, thereby securing the contested community gardens.  
 Similarly, in the case of the Sawmill Community Land Trust (Sawmill CLT) in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, a future community garden site has already been secured as 
part of a long-term development agreement between the land trust and the city. Sawmill 
CLT won the development bid from the City of Albuquerque to master plan and 
develop the 27-acre site, including affordable housing, economic development, and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For further studies on the Troy Gardens experience see Campbell and Salus, 2003 and Rosenberg, 2010.	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community garden component. The city is holding parcels of land until the community 
land trust is ready to develop, at which point title will be transferred to the Sawmill CLT. 
“They are essentially land banking it for us. We have the development rights [to build a 
community garden] on land that we do not even own yet” (Interview, Sawmill). Here, 
the ability to secure land for community gardens is strengthened by favorable 
government relations that are based around the larger planned unit development.  
 Of course, fee-simple ownership is always constrained by the ability to acquire 
land (Interview, OSALT). As one respondent remarks, “we try to acquire land in any 
way we can because land is so scarce” (Interview, Neighborspace Baltimore).  Another 
adds, “[Land] doesn’t pop up everywhere. You are limited because you can only acquire 
so much and we wanted to go further” (Interview, OSALT). This organization, The 
Oregon Sustainable Agricultural Land Trust (OSALT) in Portland, Oregon has acquired 
title to five community gardens in 17 years15. In contrast, the Kingston Community Land 
Trust, in Kingston, New York, was founded in 2008 and has already secured 
partnerships with 30 community gardens exclusively through use agreements. While 
fee-simple ownership is often viewed as the ideal, numerous organizational, technical 
and financial limitations may constrain the ability to access and secure land in this 
tenurial arrangement. Other arrangements have allowed some organizations to operate 
a larger number of UCG sites than would otherwise be feasible under fee-simple 
ownership.  
 
B. Conservation Easements 
 Conservation easements are voluntary restrictions that permanently limit the 
types of uses on land and are held by entities external to the titleholder (Land Trust 
Alliance, 2012).  These arrangements can offer a similar (if not greater) level of land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 OSALT owns three other non-UCG agriculture sites. In 2009, OSALT launched a partnership program, 
Urban Farm Collective, to access privately owned land for urban agriculture through use agreements.	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security compared to fee-simple ownership. One respondent holds, “ if a land trust can 
get hold of an easement that has been donated by a private landowner, then you’re done, 
land has been secured” (Interview, GP2). But the easement tool can be used in several 
ways with different implications for security and feasibility. In the most common form, a 
UCG organization holds the conservation easement while another party (often a private 
landowner) remains the titleholder. The titleholder can sell the land to another private 
party without affecting land security as stipulations in the easement permanently 
restrict the types of permitted uses on the site. So long as the easement is in place, secure 
tenure is ensured for the UCG organization. This strategy can be advantageous in terms 
of site acquisition as property owners can donate conservation easements and receive 
considerable tax benefits16 (Interview, NeighborSpace Baltimore). For example, at 
NeighborSpace Baltimore in Baltimore, Maryland, a conservation easement over the site 
of an existing memorial garden was donated to the land trust by a private landowner in 
exchange for federal tax deductions (Interview, NeighborSpace Baltimore). 
 An inverse arrangement is also possible. Land trusts can hold title to land while 
selling or donating an easement to an external entity to hold. Southside Community 
Land Trust in Providence, Rhode Island is an open-space land trust that holds title to 15 
community gardens. In recent years, they have sold the development rights associated 
with several of their community gardens to a state environmental department. This 
arrangement acts as a cash infusion from the state department that helps offset the land 
trust’s property acquisition expenses (Interview, Southside). In addition to subsidizing 
land costs, this strategy is likely to increase land security for the gardens; in order to 
build on the site, a potential developer needs to acquire both title (from the land trust) 
and the development rights (from the state department), both of which are held by 
organizations under the assumption of perpetuity (Interview, Southside). Further, state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Wright and Czerniak (2000) note that a conservation easement typically reduces the ‘paper value’ of a 
given property by 50%.	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funds used in the purchase were secured through a dedicated open-space bond that 
restricts the range of potential land uses (interview, Southside CLT). Similarly, the P-
Patch Land Trust in Seattle, Washington acquired title to several community gardens 
and later granted conservation easements on those sites now held by the City (Interview, 
P-Patch).  
  Troy Gardens employs a third derivation of the easement strategy where the 
title and the conservation easement are held by different land trust organizations. The 
Madison Area Community Land Trust (MACLT) is a community development land 
trust that developed a diverse range of land uses on a 31-acre parcel including: 
affordable co-housing, community gardens, commercial agriculture on an urban farm 
and rehabilitated open space. Title to the land is held by MACLT, while a conservation 
easement placed on the community gardens, urban farm and open space is held by a 
separate conservation land trust, the Center for Resilient Cities17. The community 
gardens are then separately leased out and managed by a third non-profit entity, 
Community Groundworks at Troy Gardens. In addition, a land-use restriction 
agreement was placed on the land as part of the Community Development Block Grant 
funding that financed the property acquisition. A total of three layers of protection – title 
held by land trust, easement held by a separate land trust, and land-use restriction tied 
to funding - secure the community gardens in place. One representative holds, “This is a 
bit of an overkill. There wasn’t really a great need to grant an easement for an external 
entity to hold due to our very mission as a land trust, but people wanted that extra layer 
of protection”(Interview, MACLT). Such arrangements undoubtedly offer a very high 
level of security, though simpler arrangements are likely to suffice. 
 While easements can effectively secure land, many practitioners note the 
impracticality of utilizing such arrangements on small, urban parcels (Interview, GP2). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The Center for Resilient Cities changed their name in 2007 from the Urban Open Space Foundation. 
Community Groundworks at Troy Gardens changed their name in 2008 from The Friends of Troy Gardens.	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In particular, the small-scale nature of community garden parcels, and resulting high 
transaction costs typically render such arrangements prohibitively expensive (Interview, 
GP2). Further, easement donations resulting in tax-exemptions trigger a higher level of 
governmental oversight to ensure a public purpose is really being met (Interview, 
NeighborSpace Baltimore). One respondent observed, “the IRS is quite judicious about 
whether or not you are taking on something that really has conservation value, and it is 
harder to make the case on urban land (Interview, NeighborSpace Baltimore).  
 
C. Use Agreements  
 Beyond fee-simple ownership and easements, the majority of organizations in 
the sample employ various use agreements, including long-term ground leases, on 
public and private lands. One respondent notes “long-term leases get you to a very 
similar place as fee-simple ownership … and it might make a lot more sense than 
outright purchase because you don’t have to buy the land.” (Interview, MACLT). The 
challenge however, is obtaining such long-term leases. Cities and private landowners 
are often wary of making long-term commitments, and even then, such agreements may 
be voided unless proper protections are written into the agreement (Interview, CDCG). 
For example, contractual clauses can be added to ensure long-term use of land even in 
the event of title changing hands. Organizations have overwhelmingly relied on short-
term and ‘handshake’ agreements even though community gardens projects are nearly 
always seen as long-term endeavors - a contradiction that is a perpetual source of 
conflict. One interviewee sums the situation: use agreements can be “less secure but if 
you can’t access land you have to pursue other options” (Interview, OSALT). Five of the 
organizations in the sample have executed use agreements with private landowners 
(both individuals and corporations). In some instances, private landowners received tax 
benefits in exchange for rent-free access for community gardening projects (Interview, 
OSALT, Kingston). More common are use agreements with governmental agencies, 
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including nine organizations in the sample. Use agreements were secured with a range 
of local government agencies, the most typical being parks departments, school districts 
and public housing authorities. 
 Given the long legacy of urban gardening on vacant city-owned properties, it is 
only natural that UCG organizations have employed use arrangements on nearly all 
types of public lands. Public agencies often own numerous vacant urban sites and can 
offer in-kind contributions of water, materials and labor. However, cities are not always 
eager to lease such lands. Management of individual garden plots can be onerous and 
city insurance policies are often highly risk-averse, making it difficult to implement less 
traditional land uses such as UCGs (Interview, MACLT).  One interview observes, “the 
city has to do so much more than just track land, it has to run a whole city” (Interview, 
Sawmill). 
 Public use agreements vary greatly in their respective levels of long-term 
security. Some are merely handshake deals18 that permit access to public lands yet offer 
no long-term control or right to continued occupation and use of the site. For instance, 
Grassroots Gardens of Buffalo in Buffalo, New York is a non-profit organization that 
leases and indemnifies city land on behalf of local gardening groups. They do not have 
secure tenure on any of their UCG sites located in the city and can be evicted with 30 
days notice if the city should decide to sell the property or convert to another land use 
(Interview, GGB). Similarly, despite persistent efforts to obtain a 99-year lease, the 
Sandhills Area Land Trust in Southern Pines, North Carolina was unable to convince 
their city council to grant them an easement or lease of any kind (Interview, Sandhills). 
Lacking these legal rights to the land, Sandhills has primarily relied on political leverage 
to maintain land security. While their garden is somewhat protected by being located in 
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  Many UCG gardens have not even executed handshake deals but are technically ‘squatters’ on 
public lands, though there may be acquiescence by municipal officials.	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a flood plain, one representative noted, “anyone can build on anything and 
[development pressure] was my greatest fear” (Interview, Sandhills).  
 City-owned land is not necessarily less vulnerable to accumulative real-estate 
pressures. Municipalities always have an interest (though not their only interest) in 
maximizing property tax revenues and have little incentive to lock-up land in long-term 
leases with no hope of future accumulation (Interview, MACLT). Even in the case of 
temporary gardens, one respondent observed, “we have a harder time getting land for 
new [temporary] gardens, the City doesn’t trust that there is such a thing a temporary 
garden, once you get people there, it’s hard to take it away again” (Interview, South 
End). It is an ongoing challenge for land trusts to make the case that the accommodative 
benefits of the UCG can exceed the opportunity costs of foregone tax revenues. The 
planning profession is also complicit in the framing of the problem. One respondent 
states, “there is still a sense from the office of taxation and the planning department that 
the best use [of land] is development because that brings property tax to the city…. but 
how do we start making the case for the value of functional food production sites in the 
city” (Interview, Southside). Others argue that cities have unrealistic optimism in 
anticipating real estate markets to rebound, especially in rustbelt regions with declining 
populations. In trying to convince a municipality to transfer title for several UCGs, one 
respondent expressed frustration stating, “no one is going to buy and develop a little lot 
propped between two houses in a city like that (rustbelt region with a declining 
population) and no one is going to want to take a community resource away from a 
community like that” (Interview, CDCG).  
 Given this vulnerability, many land trusts have looked to secure partnerships on 
more stable forms of public land. In particular, partnerships with schools districts and 
parks departments stand out as common types of public-private use agreements. These 
agreements vary widely in terms of land security. Some are long-term (25-year), 
contractual use agreements (Los Angeles Neighborhood Land Trust) and others are 
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simply informal handshake arrangements (CDCG). These types of institutional 
partnerships can be found throughout history, as they are highly compatible with the 
UCG themes of nature, education, and self-help through household food production 
(Lawson, 2005). In general, these arrangements have resulted in relatively secure tenure; 
schools are unlikely to sell land and have strategic opportunities through education to 
build engaged garden constituencies (Interview, LANLT). Parks partnerships can also be 
fruitful, as many cities have local ordinances restricting the sale of parkland (Interview, 
MACLT). However, unless a long-term lease is secured, land tenure still is not 
guaranteed. One respondent offered an experience with a local parks department that 
abruptly changed their mind about allowing UCGs on parkland after two years of 
community gardening and soil development (Interview, OSALT). Other land trusts have 
had difficulty in convincing local parks departments to allow community gardens, as 
local agencies question the public benefit of such gardens (Interview, Kingston). 
 Private use agreements can also offer low-cost access to land that can be secured 
at a relatively low cost and with minimal staff capacity (especially compared to 
easements). Many of these gardens have stood the test of time; one organization has 
entered into an annual use agreement with a private landowner for the past 30 years 
(Interview, CDCG). In some cases, these use agreements have been so effective that the 
original landowner loses track of the land and “wouldn’t even acknowledge that [the 
land] was theirs and completely ignored our letters”(Interview, CDCG). Ultimately, the 
strength of these partnerships relies on the duration and the quality of the contractual 
use agreement. For example, ground leases executed by many Community Land Trusts 
are legally defensible contracts that offer very secure, long-term land tenure. But not all 
use agreements are written in such rigorous terms and lower quality use agreements 
may offer only minimal or no legal standing. Thus, land security is highly dependent on 
the structure of the lease and the provisions it contains. Such provisions could include 
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the right to continued occupation and use in the event of a title transfer and the right of 
first refusal to purchase property in the event of a sale.  
 Lacking such rigorous contingencies, lower quality use agreements largely rely 
on the cooperation and benevolence of the private landowner. However, landowners 
often have the option to not renew short-term contracts even when significant 
investments have been made. One respondent states, “it’s their land and they can do 
what they want with it” (Interview, CDCG). Longer leases (5 - 10 years) do not 
necessarily offer greater security from eviction if they do not contain adequate 
provisions. One respondent holds that in some instances, use agreements “are basically 
worth less than the paper it’s written on” (Interview, CDCG). Further, when land is sold 
and title changes hands, the cost of improvements (built structures, fencing, water lines, 
soil improvements and sweat equity  - sometimes adding up to over $15,000) can be 
completely lost if adequate provisions are not written into the use agreement (Interview, 
CDCG). One interviewee offered, “It’s gotten so bad that we are actually getting gun shy 
now about entering into these agreements, it’s a big [financial] investment to lose, and 
people get very invested in these sites… it’s heartbreaking” (Interview, CDCG).  
 The tenuousness of short-term use agreements has important implications. One 
respondent emphasized the difficulty in raising funds for capital improvements for sites 
that lack long-term security (Interview, CDCG). Gardeners too are more hesitant to 
make long-term investments if land is insecure. After all, the commitment to build up 
healthy garden soil (which can take several years) makes little sense if a UCG is 
operated on a year-to-year lease (Interview, MACLT).  
 Several organizations observed the trend towards increasing utilization of short-
term and relatively lax use agreements. These arrangements tend to require less 
financial and organizational capacity, and can be used to operate a larger number of 
UCG sites than would otherwise be possible through other tenurial arrangements. 
However, they do so at the expense of long-term land security. This trend raises the 
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question of the meaning and role of a land trust. Traditionally, land trusts have served 
the role of being stewards over land, a function that is increasingly in question as 
organizations move towards shorter-term and less secure forms of tenurial agreements. 
One land trust organization - Growing Power headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin - 
operates primarily through use agreement and is currently reevaluating its legal status 
and identity as a land trust (Interview, GP1).  
 
2.2 Capacity 
  Beyond tenurial arrangements, land security is also dependent on the capacity of 
the UCG organization. This includes the ability to secure operational funding and 
adequate organizational staffing to manage ongoing stewardship programs. Should a 
UCG organization ever dissolve, UCG site permanence may become threatened 
(Interview, Southside). 
 There are a number of basic operational services that many UCG organizations 
provide such as: liability insurance19, water infrastructure, environmental testing and 
emergency repairs. However, grant funding is frequently tied to the acquisition and 
creation of new community gardens with minimal funding opportunities for ongoing 
operations (Interview, CDCG). Many UCG organizations have struggled to develop 
sustainable revenue sources to support long-term operations. In particular, ongoing 
activities such as leadership training and organizing activities are central features and 
major costs for many UCG programs. “It is part of our mission and a challenge, we build 
community in perpetuity. As changes come to the neighborhood and the land, the 
community will have the capacity to manage it” (Interview, LANLT).  
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  By becoming members of the national Land Trust Alliance, legally-recognized land trusts can enjoy 
reduced rates on liability insurance. Many of the land trusts in the sample participate in this program. 
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 Finding operational funding can be difficult as the gardens themselves generate 
very little revenue20. Plots are usually leased for nominal fees with the explicit intention 
of remaining affordable to lower income residents. Due to limited funding sources, 
many organizations operate with completely voluntary staff. However, some land trusts, 
like OSALT, are reaching the limits of voluntary organizational capacity, “We need a full 
time staff if we are going to continue to grow” (Interview, OSALT). Another respondent 
felt discouraged about the constant struggle to meet basic requirements and felt that 
municipal ownership of community gardens simply made more sense: insurance and 
water are easily handled by local governments that have considerably more resources at 
their disposal to manage such simple expenditures (Interview, South End). Others 
echoed this sentiment, citing how long-term leases on municipal land could offer similar 
security to fee-simple ownership without shouldering the full cost of providing base 
services. However, municipalities are rarely willing to tie themselves to such long-range 
agreements (Interview, MACLT).  
 The issue of limited capacity rekindles the debate of government offloading to 
‘third sector’ organizations without a concomitant increase in funding mechanisms. The 
experience of the South End Lower Roxbury Open Space Land Trust in Boston, 
Massachusetts is indicative of this trend. The Boston Redevelopment Authority had 
acquired so much vacant and abandoned land throughout the 1970-80s, that they were 
very eager to devolve land (and maintenance responsibilities) to a third sector 
organization. The land trust now manages, maintains, and makes capital improvements 
on as many open space parcels in the neighborhood as the parks department, only 
without the support of public tax dollars (Interview, South End). In fact, the land trust 
often must compete with the city itself in seeking private sources of grant funding. One 
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  One respondent notes the potential of scaled pricing for UCG organizations. A percentage of garden 
plots could be set aside for entrepreneurial commercial growers and leased at higher rates (Interview, 
MACLT). 
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representative notes the problem of third-sector devolution, “In retrospect, we let 
government off the hook way too easily” (Interview, South End).  
 The level of support provided by local governments is one of the key variables in 
determining the potential for long-term security (Interview, MACLT). Governmental 
support can come in many different forms. At its inception, the Los Angeles 
Neighborhood Land Trust was awarded $400,000 in start-up grants from the City of Los 
Angeles. In Chicago, there is a twenty-year intergovernmental agreement between the 
City of Chicago, the City Parks District and the Forest Preserve District that provides 
$100,000 in annual funding to support Neighborspace operations. In Seattle, the P-Patch 
program is municipally owned and operated with the P-Patch Land Trust acting in a 
supportive role as advocate and occasional titleholder. Such strong public sector 
commitment to UCGs is unusual. “In other cities, [local governments] were not willing 
to give away land for free. In Chicago they said, we aren’t giving it away, this is an 
investment in our communities and our open space” (Interview, Neighborspace). Other 
land trusts receive various types of governmental support including in-kind 
contributions of labor, materials, and water, the option to purchase vacant land for 
nominal fees and political backing in planning and development efforts.  
 
2.3 Political Leverage 
 The political leverage to negotiate effective external relations adds another 
dimension to the land security equation. Some organizations, like Growing Power, 
headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, have gained relatively secure access to UCG 
lands not through strong tenurial arrangements but by leveraging the considerable 
political weight of their name. Growing Power’s founder Will Allen is a star in the 
burgeoning food movement, receiving considerable media accolades especially 
following his 2008 reception of a MacArthur Fellows Grant. While Growing Power 
currently has a high level of confidence in their ability to access land, the long-term 
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sustainability of this strategy is uncertain (Interview, GP1). What will happen when 
Allen one day steps down? One respondent keenly observes, “the best time to secure 
land is when there’s the least need to do so” (Interview, MACLT). After all, political 
climates are vulnerable to sudden changes as economic conditions vary and new 
administrations are elected. Similarly, the Sandhills Area Land Trust, unable to secure a 
long-term lease from the municipality, has turned to political pressure to keep the 
garden in place. “All the movers and the shakers in the city funded [the garden] so 
heaven help the city if they try to get rid of it now” (Interview, Sandhills). Some 
neighborhood non-profits have even gone so far as to voluntarily pay property taxes 
(despite their tax-exempt non-profit status) in order to strengthen their political voice 
(Interview, GP2).  
 A particular facet of political leverage relates to organizational scale. ‘Scale’ here 
refers primarily to absolute size of an organization - staffing, budgets, number of 
gardens, and number of garden constituents – although geographic scale, defined as 
physical dispersion across territories, can also impact land security through broad 
political coalition building. Three organizational scales were identified: single-site, 
intermediate neighborhood scale, and city/regional scale. Single-site organizations 
operate around a single community garden. While very small in scale, such 
organizations are likely to be very numerous (Interview, South End). Intermediate 
neighborhood-scale organizations concentrate at a neighborhood or sub-neighborhood 
level and city/regional scale organizations operate many gardens spread throughout a 
single city or multiple city-regions.  
 Organizational scale impacts the potential for political leverage with external 
actors such as philanthropic organizations and governmental agencies. Larger 
organizations tend to have greater visibility and access to philanthropic communities 
(Interview, South End). Further, larger scale organizations have greater bargaining 
power and political clout vis-à-vis state actors. Several interviewees observe the 
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uncertainty and antagonism that can sometimes characterize relations with local 
governments. For example, one respondent holds, “there is no such thing as absolute 
community garden permanence because there is always the threat of eminent domain 
and they can always come up with something and say it’s a higher and better use… 
having a land trust does not protect us from politics and the whims of various 
government agencies”(Interview, South end). This organization operated on ambivalent 
terms with local authorities for years until a recent administration was elected. Since 
then, they have faced numerous administrative hurdles; for example the simple act of 
installing a new garden fence was delayed 9 months and required filing for a zoning 
variance, which the zoning commission later agreed was unnecessary (Interview, South 
End). This organization is now in the process of merging with a larger, city-wide, non-
profit that holds over 50 community gardens. The larger organization, by virtue of its 
size, “does not get pushed around by the city the way we do” (Interview, South End). 
This arrangement also has the potential to increase their capacity and clout, and will 
allow the land trust to secure substantial new operational funds (Interview, South End).  
 Different scales of engagement can suggest different roles for UCG organizations. 
Smaller scale organizations are more closely involved with garden users and organizing 
efforts. At larger scales, organizations concentrate more on holding title and providing 
stewardship activities while devolving many operational and organizing responsibilities 
to local groups. This is not to say that larger organizations are not active in community 
organizing, but that their role shifts from day-to-day garden management to that of 
leadership development and training. Larger UCG organizations tend to have less 
interaction with on-the-ground garden users, and frequently operate through 
intermediaries. One large city-wide organization held that, “it is not really a democracy, 
more of a oligarchy or a representative democracy” (Interview, Neighborspace). It 
should be noted that some UCG organizations have been criticized as lacking 
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transparency, accountability and representation with individual garden-level users 
(Eizenberg, 2012).  
 Several organizations are in the process of shifting to larger scales of action 
through various partnerships strategies. For example, OSALT is looking to increase their 
impact by expanding beyond fee-simple ownership through their Urban Farm Collective, 
a program that secures use agreements on private lands for urban agriculture. Southside 
CLT is looking to enlarge their programming and site acquisitions to a city-wide scale, 
but in a manner that does not overextend their capacity limitations. They have partnered 
to create the Providence Community Gardens Network, a decentralized system of 40 
gardens. Individual neighborhoods have a garden hub location that serves as an 
educational and resource distribution center. This model is described as “a more organic 
system, and not done in a way that is top-down” (Interview, Southside). Finally, the 
South End Lower Roxbury Open Space Land Trust seeks to increase their organizational 
scale for political and capacity reasons by merging with a larger, city-scale non-profit, 
but will exist as a semi-autonomous unit within the larger organization (Interview, 
South End).  
 
 
2.4 Mission and Internal Governance 
 UCG organizational modes and their resulting impacts on land security can be 
differentiated along two final interrelated dimensions – organizational mission and 
internal governance with garden-level users. Through the interview protocol, we found 
subtle differences in organizational missions and goals in regards to UCGs. 
Organization mission is discussed above (Section 2.1) in relation to different land uses 
including housing, religious institutions and open-space. Here we revisit the issue of 
organizational mission in the specific context of community gardens spaces. These are 
only preliminary observations as the scope of the study was necessarily narrow, 
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preventing the possibility of speaking directly with garden users in order to assess their 
perspective. Still, a general distinction can be made between organizations that view 
community gardens as an end rather than a means. The former category tends to 
promote UCGs primarily for individual, tangible benefits – improved physical and 
mental health, aesthetics, education, and food security. The latter category tends to 
emphasize the value of gardens as sites where communities are formed, relationships 
forged, and people come together. One interviewee described this difference in 
organizational missions as the “build it and they will come model versus building 
sustainable community to support the garden” (Interview, SELROSLT). Of course, all 
UCG organizations exhibit qualities from both categories, the distinction being merely a 
matter of degree. In fact, different individual garden-users can even fill differentiated 
roles within a single gardening community: some gardeners just want to grow food, 
some want to coordinate events and activities, and some are interested in politics and 
governance (Interview, MACLT). 
 The difference in organizational mission - means versus ends – interrelates with 
the internal governance relations with gardeners. In general, organizations that value 
UCGs as an end tend to be more top-down in governance and largely rely on objective 
legal property rights to secure land. In contrast, organizations that value UCGs as a 
means to community development tend to emphasize bottom-up processes, and secure 
land through objective property rights and by engendering subjective meaning and 
‘ownership in use’. A simplified classification can be constructed to describe this 
organizational diversity (See Figure 1.) 
  Regarding top-down governance, some organizations take a more hands-on 
approach, managing site acquisition, garden design and construction while overseeing 
plot-waiting lists for individual gardens. These organizations see their role as preserving 
access to community gardens for gardening's sake. “Some people are very clear they just 
want to come and do their gardening. They don’t want to socialize. They want to garden 
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to get away from it all” (Interview, CDCG). Such organizations emphasize the role of a 
‘strong board of directors’ for funding and innovation and the importance of having 
numerous committees (Interview, Kingston). 
 
Figure 1. Relations between organizational mission, internal governance relations and 
types of land security. 
 
 In contrast, other organizations value gardens primarily as sites where bottom-
up, community formation can occur. “The real activity is happening at the site 
themselves, not at the top management level, not at the board level” (Interview, OSALT). 
Similarly, another interviewee holds that “the community comes first, gardening is 
really just a wonderful, beautiful and delicious excuse for the community to come 
together, explore its own becoming and put its ideas into practice” (Interview, 
Neighborspace). Another organization requires all new gardens to partner with local 
non-profit organizations to build community buy-in and cohesion (Interview, LANLT). 
These organizations emphasize leadership training and structured representation 
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be elected directly from the gardeners (Interview, Southside). Paradoxically, these 
organizations tend to take a less active role in management as gardens evolve over time. 
“The community groups will slowly take over the role of leadership but the land trust 
will always be there” (Interview, LANLT). Though one respondent notes that even 
when a UCG organization holds title, and the community is managing the garden, “you 
still need strong oversight and basic guidelines to help” (Interview, NeighborSpace). 
 Those that view gardens as a means tend to also support gardens as sites of 
democratic action. One organization encourages gardeners to self-organize into any 
leadership structure as long as three garden leaders are identified; “Within a basic set of 
rules, each garden can define its own self-determination… it’s democracy writ 
large”(Interview, NeighborSpace). The very act of discussing the potential location and 
identity of a community garden with neighbors and local politicians can serve as an 
organizing catalyst. “If you can pull off a community garden you can pull off a lot of 
things. You have to learn how to run a meeting, how to communicate with your block 
and fundraise, how to maintain safety, and because of land politics you inevitably have 
to deal with your local alderman and the police. This opens up new lines of 
communication” (Interview, NeighborSpace).  
 The organizational mission and internal governance relations with garden level 
users can affect the subjective meaning of UCG spaces. Organizations that emphasize 
garden-scale organizing and autonomy are more likely to engender spatial meanings 
that encourage ‘ownership in use’ of a site (Stahaeli et al., 2002). A representative of one 
such organization holds, “a community garden is like an ‘etch a sketch’ you create 
something wonderful and then shake it up after three years, it’s constantly changing and 
evolving with different people” (Interview, NeighborSpace). This organization sees the 
UCG as an “entry point into democracy”, where “communities can put their ideas into 
practice in a more immediate way than can be typically done in modern cities” 
(Interview, NeighborSpace). Similarly, at Troy Gardens, existing community gardens 
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provided the entry point for community mobilization to prevent loss of the site and to 
advocate for a new development vision. “Community gardens saved Troy Gardens… 
community gardens are the best engine of community building that I have ever seen, 
crossing every conceivable boundary of class, race and culture (Interview, MACLT).  
 These two aspects of land security – objective and subjective - are closely related 
as the relative level of land security, in the legal sense, affects the subjective meaning of 
community garden spaces, and vice versa. One respondent, commenting on the 
desirability of gaining a more durable hold over urban gardening sites, notes “it isn’t a 
secret that if we were able to provide longer term solutions, folks would dedicate more 
time and resources and view the community gardens more as an active fabric of their 
neighborhoods” (Interview, GGB).  
 
3. Policy Implications 
The strengths and challenges associated with different UCG strategies suggest several 
planning and policy opportunities to improve UCG land security.  
 
3.1 Role of the Public Sector 
 There are many opportunities to increase the role of the public sector – both in 
terms of level of support and the diverse kinds of support - in partnering with UCG 
organizations. UCGs play a vital role in the urban open space system that is “different 
from but alongside” traditional public spaces (Interview, Neighborspace). They provide 
public amenities and access to open space, opportunities to build active citizenry and 
mobilized communities, and reduce the maintenance responsibilities for local 
governments. Given these public benefits, a lack of public funding essentially “let[s] 
government off the hook”(Interview, SELROPLT).  Localities need to be pushed to 
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recognize the economic, environmental and social value of UCG spaces and to reframe 
these spaces as permanent investments in neighborhood infrastructure. 
 Greg Rosenberg, the former executive director of MACLT, has a saying that 
holds, “Everyone should do what they are good at”. In the UCG context, this means that 
land trust should focus on being stewards of land, local groups should focus on 
community organizing and day-to-day UCG operations, and local governments should 
focus on setting public priorities, ensuring equitable distribution of resources and 
providing financial, policy and in-kind support. This closely mirrors the concept of 
“nonprofit federalism” as developed by Salamon (1987). Theoretical clarity on this point 
is needed. The traditional (and flawed) theory of the welfare state posits that third-sector 
organizations fill the gaps where both market and governmental failures occur. This 
assumption should be turned on its head, with the public sector filling the gaps where 
market and third-sector organizations struggle to meet social needs (Salamon, 1987.  
Government is not a substitute, but a supplement to third sector action as the strengths 
of the public sector – raising funds and creating democratic avenues for a (relatively) just 
distribution of resources – corresponds well with the inherent weaknesses of the third 
sector (Salamon, 1987). Understanding that the public sector is well positioned to take a 
larger presence in UCG activities simply requires us to take a broader view of the public 
role beyond mere public ownership.  
 UCG partnerships via ‘nonprofit federalism’ can come in a variety of forms. 
Direct funding can manifest in organizational start-up grants (Los Angeles 
Neighborhood Land Trust), on-going operational appropriations (Neighborspace, 
NeighborSpace Baltimore), or purchase of easements and development rights (Southside 
CLT and P-Patch). City officials can partner with land trusts to transfer title or 
easements on suitable municipal lands (CDCG, SELROSLT), encourage UCGs as 
catalyzing features in wider development projects (Troy Gardens, Sawmill CLT), and 
offer in-kind contributions of water, materials and labor (Southside, Sandhills Area). 
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Finally, municipal governments can even own and operate garden programs with UCG 
organizations, playing a supporting role in land ownership, stewardship and advocacy 
(P-Patch). 
 
3.2 Cross-Sectoral Partnerships  
 A second opportunity exists to build broad complementary partnerships 
between UCGs and other accommodative land uses. Much of the community garden 
discourse has emphasized conflicts that arise between different accommodative land 
uses, most notably pitting community gardens against affordable housing (Schmelzkopf, 
1995). As one representative of New York City’s Housing and Preservation Department 
once put it, “Gardens are great, but not at the expense of new housing” (Madsen, 2002). 
Framing the issue as housing versus gardens is misleading and assumes a zero-sum 
contestation that can fragment and undermine fragile accommodative alliances (Smith & 
Kurtz, 2004). However, the experience of several land trusts in our sample21 suggests 
that communities can effectively balance these competing uses of land. There is a 
tremendous opportunity to take a more holistic approach to neighborhood development 
with community gardens complementing other accommodative uses such as housing, 
human services and neighborhood retail (Rosenberg, 2010). At Troy Gardens, the 
community gardens served as the flash point for an organizing movement that 
effectively secured property for both the existing community gardens and affordable 
housing (Campbell and Salus, 2003). If not for the activism around community gardens, 
the land would likely have been converted to a market-rate suburban subdivision that 
included no affordable housing (Interview, MACLT).  
 Further, community gardens can serve as a catalyst for wider redevelopment 
efforts. As the UCG is typically popular and non-threatening to neighborhood residents, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Madison Area Community Land Trust, South End Lower Roxbury Open Space Land Trust, 
Sandhills Area Land Trust, P-Patch Community Gardening Program	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it can help deflect the criticism that often mounts around affordable housing 
development (Interview, MACLT). Similarly, UCGs can be used to illustrate the virtues 
of community ownership. “People love hearing about community land trust and 
community gardens. Everybody loves it. If you tell them about the housing first, they 
don’t get [the ownership structure] at all, the model makes much more intuitive sense 
for agriculture than for housing” (Interview, MACLT).  
 Gardens are also strategically important in development efforts as they can be 
implemented relatively quickly, and offer a highly visible and tangible symbol of 
neighborhood revitalization (Interview, Sandhills). They are a less risky investment in 
places and times when residential real estate markets are in turmoil. In contrast to the 
simplistic affordable housing versus gardens framing, is the experience of the Sandhills 
Area Land Trust. The city’s initial grant proposal to secure federal HOPE VI housing 
funds was not accepted. However, they resubmitted the grant and included a 
community garden as a central redevelopment feature and were successful in securing 
$20 million grant (Interview, Sandhills). The success of the funding cannot be attributed 
solely to the community garden but illustrates that these uses are not contradictory and 
can be used to support one another.  
 Placing a greater emphasis on community gardening as a central piece of 
community development efforts can even strengthen land trust organizations 
themselves (Interview, MACLT). A representative of the Sandhills Area Land Trust 
observed how taking on a UCG project, “opened up and brought an entirely new 
audience to conservation that normally would never think of such things and that was 
the real jewel, to reach another population group that typically was not involved in 
conservation” (Interview, Sandhills). UCG programming can also considerably expand 
the scope of potential philanthropic support. “Urban agriculture puts you in 
conversation with people you would never talk to if it was just housing because the 
philanthropic community understands food” (Interview, MACLT).  
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 But the reverse is also true, as cross-sectoral partnerships can in turn strengthen 
community gardens programs. Some elitist UCG organizations lack transparency and 
accountability to garden-level users and residents of the surrounding neighborhood 
(Eizenberg, 2012). Adding a community development element to such existing 
organizations can open up new avenues for additional accountability and local 
representation. Despite potential conflicts around missions and goals, cross-sectoral 
partnerships between differing accommodative land uses offers a fertile nexus that has 
been underutilized thus far.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 UCG organizations have adopted a variety of organizational modes to address 
the issue of UCG land security with different levels of success. Land security is 
objectively achieved through legal property rights and subjectively shaped through the 
notion of ‘ownership in use’ and by encouraging the formation of mobilized 
communities. This study analyzes the variety of organizational modes – differentiated 
by tenurial arrangement, capacity, political leverage and organizational 
mission/internal governance relations – and the resulting impacts on the type and level 
of land security. Three key themes emerge from this analysis.  
 First, many organizations are balancing the trade-offs between maximizing land 
tenure security and operating a larger number of UCG sites under less secure tenure 
arrangements. On one hand, organizations can maximize security by using more costly, 
but highly secure, forms of tenure (like fee-simple ownership) on a limited number of 
garden sites. Alternatively, organizations can strive for a larger scale impact (both in 
terms of absolute number of gardens and scale of geographic territory) by controlling 
many gardening sites through forms of tenure that are financially and politically easier 
to acquire but that only provide short-term, precarious hold over those sites.  
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Fee-simple ownership can be a very secure form of tenure, but can also limit the 
potential scale of the UCG organization as the financial burdens and legal risk of fee-
simple ownership can be prohibitively costly to utilize in large scale. Conservation 
easements can also result in secure land tenure without the financial burden of 
purchasing the land, though legal transactions costs can sometimes be prohibitively 
expensive. Use agreements vary widely, ranging from those that offer minimal legal 
protection for the occupation and use of garden plots to those that provide long-term 
security of tenure for UCG organizations, and for the gardeners themselves. Simple and 
rudimentary use agreements may be the most financially and politically feasible option 
for accessing a large numbers of garden sites and to expand the geographic and 
organizational scale of UCG programs given very limited resources. However, this trend 
raises questions about the appropriate role of land trusts and the public sector in 
enabling accommodative uses on land. What makes a land trust a land trust if it doesn’t 
have long-term control of land? Should land trusts (and other third sector organizations) 
bear the majority of the costs in these providing public amenities and neighborhood 
investments?  
 Second, organizational capacity and political leverage can greatly influence land 
security. Organizational constraints of limited staffing and operational funding are 
major obstacles to realizing more secure forms of tenure.  Further, the political leverage 
of a UCG organization in relation to external funding sources and state actors is also 
crucially important. In general, larger organizations have more political leverage and 
visibility to access funds. Several smaller land trusts are in the process of moving to 
larger organizational and geographic scales to have a greater impact and to increase 
political leverage. The role of UCG organizations also changes at different organizational 
scales. Single-site and intermediate/neighborhood scale organizations are more directly 
involved in maintenance and organizing efforts, while larger city/regional scale 
organizations tend to devolve such responsibilities to local community groups and focus 
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more on leadership training. Some have suggested that larger scale organizations can 
help individual gardeners feel less isolated and empower the synthesis of a larger 
gardening and public space movement (Smith and Kurtz, 2004). 
 Finally, the organizational mission and internal governance relations between 
UCG organizations and garden-level users influence the subjective meaning of UCG 
spaces. Organizations that emphasize garden-level organizing and autonomy have 
greater potential for fostering a sense ‘ownership in use’ and engendering community 
formation and mobilization around land security issues.  
 This analysis should be viewed as an early exploration into the role of land trusts 
in community gardens and more broadly, urban agriculture. Further research is needed 
to examine the possibilities for engagement with urban entrepreneurial/commercial 
agricultural operations. Such operations may offer use-value centered opportunities to 
expand the scope of local food production, build wider political constituencies, and 
result in more sustainable funding mechanisms. In the end, practitioners and 
policymakers must continue to find innovative models for securing land in a way that 












	   45	  
Appendix 
List of Organizations in Sample 
 
         Organization           Location 
Capital District Community Gardens   Capital District Region, NY 
Grassroot Gardens of Buffalo     Buffalo, NY 
Growing Power      Milwaukee, WI/ Chicago, IL 
Kingston Land Trust      Kingston, NY 
Los Angeles Neighborhood Land Trust   Los Angeles, CA 
Madison Area Community Land Trust   Madison, WI 
Neighborspace      Chicago, IL 
NeighborSpace Baltimore     Baltimore, MD 
Neighborhood Gardens Association/   Philadelphia, PN 
A Philadelphia Land Trust 
 
Oregon Sustainable Agricultural Land Trust  Portland, OR  
Pottstown Community Land Trust    Pottstown, PA 
P-Patch Land Trust      Seattle, WA 
Sandhills Area Land Trust     Southern Pines, NC 
Sawmill Community Land Trust    Albuquerque, AZ 
South End Lower Roxbury Open Space Land Trust  Roxbury, MA 
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